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Abstract This note discusses a verification in PVS of the AID (Appli­
cation Identifier) class from JavaCard’s API. The properties th a t are 
verified are formulated in the interface specification language JML. This 
language is also used to express the properties tha t are assumed about 
the native methods from the Util class tha t are used in the AID class. 
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1 Introduction
This short note describes the obvious next step after the formal specifica­
tion in JML [9,8] of JavaCard’s API in [11], namely actual verification that 
the current reference implementation (version 2.1) [1] satisfies these spec­
ifications. This verification is done w ith the proof tool PVS [10], based on 
the translation of Java and JML into PVS, as incorporated in the LOOP 
tool, see [12], This verification forms a test, bo th  for the JML specifi­
cations, and for the Java implementations (and of course also for the 
LOOP tool). Here we concentrate on a small part of the API, involving 
essentially only the classes Util and AID. The emphasis is not so much 
on the actual statem ents th a t are being verified (because they are not 
so spectacular), bu t on how the results and assumptions are formulated 
and used in proofs. An earlier case study [6] in library class verification 
concentrated on the Vector class. It did not use a formal semantics of 
JML.
The JavaCard API specifications in JML make many implicit assump­
tions explicit, and provide useful (and hopefully readable) documentation, 
see [11]. But one can also make mistakes in writing specifications, so it
To appear in the Proceedings of the JavaCard Workshop, Cannes, Sept. 2000.
is im portant to actually verify them, if possible. One option is static 
checking, like w ith E SC /Java [13]. This is certainly very effective and 
useful, bu t only allows (automatic) checking of certain “simple” prop­
erties, w ithout guarantee of absolute correctness1. We see our approach 
as complementary, for providing additional certainty: our verifications are 
based on a m athem atical semantics of Java (expressed in the logic of PVS) 
th a t allows in principle arbitrarily complex assertions. But the activity of 
proving such assertions is interactive, and far from autom atic. The fact 
th a t bo th  static and semantic analysis (and even run-tim e checking of as­
sertions [3]) is possible for JML is a strong advantage of this specification 
language.
This paper can only give an impression of some of the issues in API 
verification. It discusses these issues via an example.
2 JavaCard’s U til class: specification
The AID class makes use of two methods from the U t i l  class, namely 
arrayCopy and arrayCompare. Both these methods are static, final and 
native: ‘static’ means th a t they can be invoked w ithout a receiving object, 
‘final’ th a t they cannot be overridden, and ‘native’ tha t no actual Java 
code is provided, bu t their implementation is given in some other (low- 
level) language.
The behaviour of these methods is described in informal comments in 
the Util. Java file. We quote these explanations:
arrayCopy: “Copies an array from the specified source array, beginning 
a t the specified position, to the specified position of the destination 
array (non-atomically).” 
arrayCompare: “Compares an array from the specified source array, be­
ginning at the specified position, w ith the specified position of the 
destination array from left to right. Returns the ternary result of the 
comparison : less than (-l), equal(O) or greater th a n (l) .”
More information is given in the javadoc clarifications, see [1], especially 
about when exceptions may be expected. Such information is im portant 
for correct use of the JavaCard API in applets.
1 It may be interesting to note tha t the verification of the getBytes method that 
is discussed in Section 3 below has also been done in ESC/Java, but without the 
modifies clauses. The ESC/Java tool accepted this example in only a few seconds, 
indicating th a t it saw no errors. (W ith thanks to Jim Saxe from Compaq SRC for 
demonstrating this example.)
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public static final native short arrayCopy(byte[] src,
short srcOff, 
byte [] dest, 
short destOff, 
short length)
throws ArraylndexOutOfBoundsException, 
NullPointerException,
TransactionException;
/*@ behavior
@ requires: src != null k k  srcOff >= 0 k k
@ srcOff + length <= src.length k k
@ dest != null k k destOff >= 0 k k
@ destOff + length <= dest.length k k
@ length >= 0;
@ modifiable: dest[*];
@ ensures: true;
@ signals: (TransactionException) true;
a*/
public static final native byte arrayCompare(byte[] src,
short srcOff, 
byte[] dest, 
short destOff, 
short length)
throws ArraylndexOutOfBoundsException,
NullPointerException;
/*@ normal_behavior
@ requires: src != null k k srcOff >= 0 k k
@ srcOff + length <= src.length k k
@ dest != null k k destOff >= 0 k k
@ destOff + length <= dest.length k k
@ length >= 0;
@ modifiable: \nothing;
@ ensures: true;
a*/
F ig u r e l . JML specifications for arrayCopy and arrayCompare from Util
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We shall use formal specifications in JML, as described in Figure 1 (see 
also [11])- They concentrate on norm al/abrupt term ination and modifi­
cation, and say nothing about the functional behaviour of these methods. 
Hence our specifications are clearly incomplete (at this stage). But they 
do already convey useful information (and are strong enough to prove the 
AID specifications in the next section).
Instead of explaining JML in general, we explain only the meaning of 
these specifications. The behavior keyword indicates th a t if the precon­
dition as given by the requires clause holds, then either the m ethod ter­
minates normally, and the “normal” postcondition after the ensures key­
word holds, or the m ethod term inates abruptly  because of an exception 
of the type indicated after signals, and the ensuing “abru p t” postcondi­
tion holds. The keyword normal-behavior, instead of just behavior, in­
dicates th a t the method must term inate normally, provided the precondi­
tion holds. The behavior specifications are translated into partial Hoare 
triples, and the normal-behavior specifications into to tal Hoare triples, 
in a special version of Hoare logic adapted to Java [5]. The modifiable 
clauses tell which items may be changed by the method, and thus also, 
implicitly, which are left unaltered. The m ethod arrayCompare does not 
modify anything, and thus has no side-effect. The arrayCopy method can 
modify the entries of its param eter array dest, as indicated by dest [*]. 
Actually, one can be more precise and say th a t this m ethod only modifies 
the entries of dest in the range offset, ..., offset + length -  1, but 
th a t is not needed a t this stage. The TransactionException may occur 
when an overflow arises in JavaCard’s transaction buffer—which is used 
to enable rollback of operations in case of failure.
JML is expressive enough to formulate also functional behaviour. For 
instance, for arrayCopy we could have used as ensures clause:
dest == \old(dest) k k
dest.length == \old(dest.length) k k
\forall(int i) [ i >= srcOff k k i <= srcOff + length - 1 
==> dest[i] == \old(src[i]) ] k k  
\forall(int i) [ (i >= 0 k k i < srcOff) I I
(i < dest.length k k i > srcOff + length - 1)
==> dest[i] == \old(dest[i]) ] k k  
\result == dstOff + length
But this property is not needed for the verification below.
3 JavaCard’s AID class: specification and verification
In the JavaCard platform each applet instance and package is uniquely 
identified and selected by an application identifier (AID)—and not, as
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usual, by a string possibly in combination w ith a domain name, see [4, 
§§3.8]. AIDs are used in loading and linking. As prescribed in the ISO 7816 
standard, each AID consists of an array of bytes, ranging in length from 
5 to 16. The first five bytes form what is called the resource identifier 
(RID), which is assigned by ISO to a company. The possible remainder 
(between 0 and 11 bytes) forms the proprietary identifier extension (PIX), 
which is under the control of individual companies.
Space restrictions prevent us from discussing the AID class in full, so 
we concentrate on the essentials. Its field, constructor and five methods, 
w ithout their implementations, look as follows.
public final class AID{ 
byte[] the AID;
public AID(byte[] bArray, short offset, byte length) ... 
public byte getBytes(byte[] dest, short offset) ... 
public boolean equals(Object anObject) ...
public boolean equals(byte[] bArray, short offset, byte length) ... 
public boolean partialEquals(byte[] bArray, short offset, byte length) ... 
public boolean RIDEquals (AID otherAID) ...
}
Our JML specification of this class adds a class invariant, and pre-/post- 
conditions for its constructor and methods. Since the array of an AID 
consists of a 5-byte RID possibly together w ith a PIX of up-to 11 bytes, 
our invariant is (as also mentioned in [11]):
//@ invariant : theAID != null k k
5 <= theAID.length k k theAID.length <= 16;
The proof obligation is to show th a t this property holds after term ination 
(both normal and abrupt) of the constructor, and also th a t it holds after 
term ination (both normal and abrupt) of each method, assuming it holds 
in the state in which the m ethod is invoked2.
Here we shall concentrate on the m ethod getBytes. Its official expla­
nation is: “Called to get the AID bytes encapsulated w ithin AID object.” 
More precisely, after a successful m ethod invocation getBytes (dest, 
offset), the contents of the theAID byte array can be found a t the 
param eter entries dest [off set] ,..., dest [offset + theAID. length - 
1] . The JML specification of getBytes is:
/*@ behavior
<5 requires: dest != null k k  offset >= 0 k k
<5 offset + theAID.length <= dest.length
<5 modifiable: dest[*];
2 W hat is surprising is th a t the theAID field is not declared as private. As it stands, 
it can be modified from the outside (but only within its package), making it vulner­
able to a breach of the invariant. We consider the ommission of the private access 
modifier a bug.
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@ ensures: true;
@ signals: (TransactionException) true;
a*/
Notice th a t it only mentions term ination and modification behaviour. The 
implementation of getBytes in the JavaCard API version 2.1 consists of 
only two lines:
{
Util.arrayCopy(theAID, (short)O, dest, offset, (short)theAID.length); 
return (byte) theAID.length;
}
We briefly discuss the proof in PVS th a t this implementation satisfies 
the specification, assuming the arrayCopy m ethod from Util satisfies its 
specification in Figure 1. The main distinction in the proof is between 
normal and abrupt term ination of the getBytes method.
N orm al term ination  If the precondition and the invariant hold and 
getBytes term inates normally, then we have to show two properties about 
the post-state, namely:
1. We must show th a t only the contents of the dest array have changed, 
and nothing else. In the memory model (see [2]) in the semantics of 
Java underlying the LOOP translation, the dest param eter refers to 
a particular memory cell. W hat we prove—the LOOP translation of 
the clause modifiable dest [* ]—is th a t all memory cells except this 
one remain unaltered3. The modification property of getBytes follows 
easily from the one for arrayCopy, see Figure 1. In order to be able to 
use this arrayCopy specification, its requires clause (plus invariant, 
if any) has to be established. But th a t’s easy in this case, using the 
getBytes requires clause and the AID invariant.
2. We must show th a t the AID invariant holds in the post-state. This is 
easy by the assum ption th a t the invariant holds in the pre-state and 
the fact th a t theAID is not modified by getBytes. Even if theAID 
and dest are aliases4 the invariant is maintained, because the array 
reference dest itself and the length of the array referred to by dest are 
not modified: the modifies clause only says th a t the array components 
dest [*] may be modified.
3 Since this translation of the modifies clause is expressed in term  of cells in the 
underlying memory model, it is not restricted to the currently known fields (stored 
in already known cell positions), but it can also be used for currently unknown fields 
th a t are introduced in subclasses in the future.
4 This aliasing possibility is easily overlooked, but our semantics forces us to consider 
it explicitly.
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A bnorm al term ination  If the precondition and the invariant hold and 
getBytes term inates abruptly because of an exception, then we have to 
show th a t this exception is an instance of TransactionException, and 
th a t the “abnorm al” post-state still satisfies the two properties:
1. Only the contents of dest have changed;
2. The AID invariant still holds.
The proof is much like in the normal case, and relies on the specifica­
tion of arrayCopy. During the proof we establish explicitly th a t the (as­
sumed) abrupt term ination of getBytes is due to abrupt term ination of 
arrayCopy.
Specifications similar to the specification of getBytes have been w rit­
ten for the other AID methods and constructor. They have all been proved 
in PVS, assuming the Util specifications in Figure 1. In the end, what we 
have reached is a fully verified formal specification of a small part of the 
JavaCard API. It provides a reliable basis for building JavaCard applets. 
In due time, these specifications will be published on the web [12],
One interesting point in the semantics of specifications came up dur­
ing the verification, namely about the validity of class invariants. It is 
tem pting to use some sort of global assum ption th a t every object which 
is an instance of a class A satisfies the invariant of A. But this easily leads 
to inconsistencies, for example because invariants should hold a t the be­
ginning and end of m ethod bodies, bu t may be broken (temporarily) in 
between. W hat we have used instead is th a t the LOOP tool strengthens 
all pre-conditions w ith an assertion th a t a param eter (if any) of some class 
A satisfies the A-invariant. For example, the pre-condition of RIDEquals 
is strengthened to include an assertion th a t the param eter otherAID of 
type AID satisfies the AID-invariant. This may then be used during veri­
fication of the method. But when the m ethod specification is used, this 
pre-condition has to be established, which includes actual verification of 
the invariants of the classes of the parameters. However, this does not 
cover all cases. For example, if we have an object obj of class O bject, 
and (down)cast it to A, then we would like to use th a t (A) obj satisfies 
the A-invariant5. How to handle this in general still has to be elaborated. 
More on invariants in an object-oriented setting can be found in [7].
It is not so easy to quantify the effort th a t was needed for the whole 
AID verification, because we have used this case study as an experiment
5 This comes up during verification of the equals m ethod from AID where we have 
solved this problem by adding an extra assumption in the requires clause.
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to try  out various semantical descriptions and proof methods. But, to 
give a rough impression, handling all the possible cases for the getBytes 
m ethod in PVS takes about one hour of user interaction.
4 Conclusions
We have sketched the AID verification in PVS of its JML specification, 
based on the semantics provided by the LOOP tool. The verification in­
volves dealing explicitly with many possible cases, some of which may be 
easily overlooked. This is of course a very modest exercise, bu t it does 
show the feasibility of such validation efforts for class libraries. They will 
form the basis for actual applet verification at a later stage. Initial goals 
for these applet verifications will be proving the absence of runtim e ex­
ceptions and non-termination, and proving the absence of unwanted side 
effects (notably side effects on other applets) expressed by modifiable 
clauses.
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